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Abstract 
The chapter addresses the conditions of possibility of the emergence of the political subject. 
Drawing on the work of Giorgio Agamben, Alain Badiou and Martin Heidegger, we develop a 
formal notion of the subject as a worldly being that subtracts itself from its intra -worldly 
identity, traversing a condition of its own ‘inexistence’ in its world. It is this subtraction that 
makes possible the emergence of a subject of a genuinely universalist politics that is not tied 
to particular worlds. We shall then elaborate this idea in the context of the recent messianic 
turn in continental philosophy, addressing both the advantages and the limitations of the 
messianic account of the subject in Agamben’s reading. The chapter concludes with the 
discussion of the composition of the political subject that navigates a middle course 
between the ‘dogmatist’ universalization of subjective capacity and its ‘spontaneist’ 
limitation to those already inexistent in their world. 
Introduction 
The political subject is in for a comeback. After three decades of (post)structuralist unease 
regarding the very notion of the subject, contemporary continental or ‘post-continental’ 
thought (Mullarkey, 2007; James, 2012) has come to reassess and reassert this notion. 
Recalling the title of the well-known anthology ‘Who Comes after the Subject?’ (Cadava, 
Connor and Nancy 1991), one is tempted to answer: the subject him-, her- or maybe it- self. 
Yet, this reassertion is evidently not a matter of rehabilitating a constitutive or 
transcendental subject as a foundation of political (or other) practices but rather of tracing 
its formation in these practices.  
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Nonetheless, the fact that the subject is an immanent effect of practices does not mean that 
it is entirely produced by the existing regimes of power and knowledge, rationalities of 
government or apparatuses of control. The subject must be rigorously distinguished from 
the more general notion of agency, whose modes may well be prescribed by the existing 
order. Contemporary theories of political subjectivity, articulated in different ways and 
contexts by such different authors as Giorgio Agamben, Alain Badiou, Jean-Luc Nancy and 
Jacques Ranciere emphasize the way the subject emerges through what we shall call a dis -
identification from its ‘place’ in the world. Subjectivity is not merely irreducible to a positive 
identity but actually emerges in the act of distancing or subtracting oneself from one’s 
identity, insofar as the latter is a product of power relations and governmental rationalities. 
While the (post)Foucauldian governmentality approach tends to emphasize subjectivation 
as a process of the subject being formed in the practices of government, the theory of the 
subject that we shall outline in this chapter emphasizes the formation of the subject against 
these practices. Of course, being-against is only possible within what one is against, hence it 
would be facile to speak of a wholly different site of subjectivation. What changes from the 
Foucauldian approach to subjectivation to the more recent accounts of Agamben and 
Badiou that are the primary inspirations for our approach, is less the site than the vector of 
subjectivation, which is directed from within what in the Foucauldian-Deleuzian idiom was 
termed positivity, apparatus (dispositif) or diagram (Foucault, 1990: 77-89; Deleuze, 1988: 
21-37), and what we, following Badiou, shall term ‘world’, to its exteriority, outside or the 
void.  Nonetheless, even this shift is hardly a matter of the abandonment of the Foucauldian 
approach to subjectivity as such; after all, Foucault’s own late theorization of the subject 
unfolds under the aegis of the critical question ‘how not to be governed’ as the ‘art of not 
being governed quite so much’ (Foucault, 1997: 44).  
In this chapter we shall address the conditions of the emergence of the practitioner of this 
‘art of not being governed’ (ibid., 45). It is important to emphasize that these conditions 
pertain strictly to the possibility of the emergence of the subject and not to the actualization 
of this possibility, which remains contingent. In our approach, political subjectivation is not a 
matter of necessity – it is perfectly possible that there aren’t any political subjects in a given 
situation, context or world. Nonetheless, as this chapter shall demonstrate, the possibility 
for subjectivation does exist in any situation and indeed emerges from its very structure. 
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Our task is therefore restricted to outlining the general logic of subjectivation: how is 
something like a subject possible at all? How can there emerge, in any given world, 
characterized by a certain positive relational order, a figure defined by a distance it takes 
from this order and the possibilities of agency it prescribes?  
In the following section we shall outline the background for our argument in Badiou’s 
phenomenology of worlds and introduce the figure of the ‘inexistent’ as the object of 
political practice. We shall then proceed to develop a formal notion of the subject as a 
worldly being that subtracts itself from its intra-worldly identity and contrast it with non-
political, reactive and obscure forms of subjectivation. We shall elaborate this notion in the 
context of the recent messianic turn in continental philosophy, addressing both the 
advantages and the limitations of the messianic account of the subject in Agamben’s 
reading. The penultimate section discusses the question of the composition of the political 
subject in a critique of two approaches to this problem, the spontaneist valorization of the 
inexistent and the dogmatist overstating of subjective capacity. In the conclusion we shall 
reaffirm the dependence of the subject on the specific attunement or mood (Stimmung) 
that enables its subtraction from the order of the world. 
 
The Inexistent 
Slavoj Zizek once attributed to Lacan what seems the simplest and yet the most accurate 
definition of the subject as ‘that which is not an object’ (Zizek 1995). Transferring this 
apparently self-evident statement from the psychoanalytic context to the phenomenological 
one, we shall posit it as the starting point for our account of the subject: the subject is that 
which is not an object of the world, where the object is defined as a regulated mode of 
appearing in the world (Badiou, 2009a: 199-230). Any being, be it inorganic, animal or 
human, becomes an object of the world as soon as it is endowed with a particular identity 
(or a plurality of them) within a positive order of any given world, be this the world of 
medicine, music, elections, war, development or diplomacy. To say that the subject cannot 
be an object is then to say that it is irreducible to any intra-worldly identity, it is never 
simply a ‘worker’, ‘bourgeois’, ‘intellectual’ or ‘immigrant’ defined in positive and objective 
terms. And yet, the subject cannot simply be transcendent in relation to the world, since the 
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latter is the only possible site for its activity. Whatever is not an object of the world does not 
appear there and hence could not possibly act in it. How is then a subject possible at all? 
In order to resolve this paradox, we must address the distinction between being and 
appearance that is central to Badiou’s philosophy. The being of every worldly object 
pertains to its status as an inconsistent multiplicity amid other such multiplicities (2005a: 
58): ontology as a discourse on being qua being does not deal with individual beings or 
particular classes thereof, let alone the relations between them, but only with the sheer 
facticity of there being a multiplicity of beings. In contrast, appearance is only possible 
within a determinate situation or ‘world’, governed by an ordering structure that Badiou 
terms the transcendental, which assigns to every being a degree of existence in it (2009a: 
101, 121-122, 241-242). While, in Badiou’s materialist approach, whatever appears in the 
world is real, i.e. always has a foundation in being, the inverse is not necessarily true. It is 
possible for a real being, e.g. an illegal immigrant, a woman, a clandestine militant, a 
transsexual, a child, etc, not to appear in the world to which it ontologically belongs. This 
non-appearance may take the form of the explicit deprivation of some social groups of civil 
rights and liberties, the ban on political parties, the censorship of certain positions in the 
media, the exclusion of some topics from proper conversation, or, quite literally, the 
prohibition on the sheer appearance of a person, object or image in public.  
In Logics of Worlds Badiou terms this element that is but does not appear in the world its 
inexistent (Badiou, 2009a: 321-324).1 Since its degree of existence in the world is nil, this 
element cannot by definition be considered a proper object of the world: at best, it 
designates the zero degree of objectivity. It nonetheless remains an object in the different 
sense of the goal or objective of politics in the Badiouan understanding of the term as a 
radically universalist ‘truth procedure’ (Badiou, 2005a: 340-342; 2008: 151-153, 2009b: 241-
                                                                 
1 For an earlier and somewhat different treatment of the concept of the inexistent in Badiou’s work see 
Badiou, 2009b: 259-265. In this work Badiou has not yet made a distinction between being and appearance 
and the theme of inexistence is addressed in terms of the internal exclusion of the subject and its topological 
excess over the place it is assigned in the situation. Nonetheless, his empirical examples of the inexistent (e.g. 
immigrant proletariat in the national community) clearly resonate with his later elaboration of this concept in 
Logics of Worlds. See Bosteels (2011: 244-249) for a more detailed comparison of the use of the concept in the 
two texts. 
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273). What politics does in the world is raise the inexistent element to maximal intra-worldly 
existence, endowing a being of the world with appearance in it.2  
Be it a question of overcoming racial discrimination, legalizing ‘illegal immigrants’, 
recognizing gender equality or acquiring independent statehood, politics affirms that 
whatever is denied existence in the world nonetheless possesses being and ventures to 
grant this being maximal existence in the world in question. The political imperative thus 
consists in leveling the ontological difference: what is must also be brought to appearance in 
the world and, moreover, it must appear maximally. In accordance with the famous line 
from the Internationale, what was nothing (in the world) must become everything (Badiou, 
2005b: 115; 2011, 61).  
We may grasp Badiou’s notion of the inexistent with the help of the more specific concept 
of homo sacer, presented in Giorgio Agamben’s theory of sovereign power. Homo sacer, a 
being that may be killed with impunity as a matter of neither sacrifice nor homicide, 
functions as the exact obverse of the figure of the sovereign in the Schmittian sense as the 
one who decides on the exception: both figures are ontologically in the world yet 
phenomenally outside it, the former in the mode of majestic pseudo-transcendence and the 
latter in the form of abject, zero-degree immanence: ‘the sovereign is the one with respect 
to whom all men are potentially homines sacri, and homo sacer is the one with respect to 
whom all men act as sovereigns.’ (Agamben, 1998: 83) In more general terms, we may 
define the sovereign as the one who can make any being of the world inexistent, while the 
inexistent is the object of anyone’s sovereignty, i.e. that in relation to which even the 
lowliest dweller of the world in question perceives itself as all-powerful. And yet, if 
inexistence is never inherent in the being of the element itself, but is rather a product of the 
relational order of the world, then this status is always contingent, just as every positive 
order and every sovereign decision, which have no ontological correlate (Badiou, 2009a: 
217-220, 250-251). This means that the inexistent can always be brought to existence by the 
                                                                 
2 For a more detailed discussion of this understanding of politi cs see Prozorov (2013a: chapter 2). Our 
approach to politics distinguishes it rigorously from ‘government’ understood in the sense of the positive 
administration of the order of the world. While government is oriented towards the maintenance and 
stabilization of the order of things, politics is inherently subversive of it, since it affirms those elements of the 
world that its order has reduced to inexistence.  
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transformation of the transcendental, be it through the amendment of laws or the change 
in the social consciousness, reform from above or revolt from below.  
It is this transformation that is precisely the task of politics and, more specifically, of the 
political subject, which emerges in the space between the transcendental of the world and 
its inexistent element. Insofar as the subject cannot be anything extra- or otherworldly, it 
must exist within the world, yet this appearance cannot be reducible to that of a worldly 
object: the subject is in the world but not (wholly) of the world. In other words, the subject 
exists within the world as an exception to its objectivity. ‘Every subject persists insofar as it 
resists its conversion into an object.’ (Hallward, 2003: 242) This is why the existence of the 
subject in any given world can never be presupposed from the outset: while every human 
world is certainly populated with (individual or collective) agents, their agency becomes 
subjective only insofar as it takes exception from the positive order of the world. This is why 
‘there are few subjects and rarely any politics.’ (Badiou, 2009b: 28). In Badiou’s account, 
political subjectivity is not something that is always already at work despite its negations, 
disavowals and repressions but rather something that must be produced and maintained in 
adverse circumstances. While, as we shall argue below, political subjectivation is a 
permanent possibility in every world, its actualization and persistence depend on worldly 
beings’ taking exception to the order of the world they dwell in, inc luding their own 
identities and modes of agency. 
In Badiou’s theory of the subject in Logics of Worlds, the subject is a body (a positive intra-
worldly being or group of beings) that is capable of producing effects that transcend the 
order of ‘bodies and languages’ that positively regulates this world (2009a: 45). The subject 
is precisely ‘[the] ‘except that’, the ‘but for’ through which the fragile scintillation of what 
has no place to be makes its incision in the unbroken phrasing of a world.’ (Ibid.) The  subject 
is thus an intra-worldly being or group of beings that raises the inexistent of the world to 
maximal existence, yet is also itself characterized by inexistence, insofar as it subtracts itself 
from the transcendental order. Since the subject has its entire consistency in this 
subtraction, it is not defined by its own identity, be it individual or collective. For this 
reason, it is pointless to make any distinction between individual and collective subjects. 
Rather than attempt to grasp the subject as a being defined by individual or collective 
predicates, we shall approach it as a mode of existence, into which a worldly being can 
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enter: rather than be a subject, one is in the subject, in a mode of existence which is more 
singular than any individual (since it exposes one’s being as such) and more universal than 
any collective (since it is devoid of any distinction or predicate).  
  
Dis-Identification  
This mode of existence may be elaborated with the help of the Lacanian figure of the ‘not-
all’ developed in his discussion of feminine jouissance (Lacan, 2000: 78-81). The subject of 
politics cannot be an exception to the world in the sense of transcending its order – in fact, 
such exceptionality rather characterizes the sovereign who sustains the hegemonic pseudo-
universality of a community by transgressing its order in the manner of the Freudian primal 
father. Instead, the subject is fully immanent to the world, yet its subjection to its intra-
worldly identity is not all there is to it: it is there in the world but ‘not all there’, its 
subjection being merely ‘somewhere’ in the infinite process of subjectivation (ibid.: 103). 
This is why it is impossible to understand the process of subjectivation in terms of plenitude 
of identity: the subject is not a worldly being plus a ‘transworldly’ bonus of subjectivity, but 
rather a worldly being minus its maximal degree of existence in the world.  
Thus, the subtractive process of subjectivation consists in the deactivation of one’s worldly 
identity or, in Badiou’s more technical terms, the weakening of one’s degree of existence in 
the world. The subject of politics must first slide down the existential ladder of the world, 
only to be resurrected to maximal existence together with the inexistent object as a possible 
yet never guaranteed result of its practice. Obviously, this does not mean ceasing to exist in 
the sense of death or existing in an asthentic or withered state – on the contrary, being a 
subject is an experience of extreme existential intensity (cf. Badiou, 2009a: 507-514). This 
weakening pertains strictly to the degree of one’s positive existence as an object of the 
world, the extent to which one’s very being coincides with one’s objective appearance in the 
order of the world. In order to become the subject of politics, of the affirmation of 
universality within particular worlds, the worldly being must dis -identify with its particular 
‘place in the world’ and in this manner merge, if only momentarily, with its inex istent 
element.  
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The experience of dis-identification resonates with the states of symbolic destitution that 
we commonly tend to associate with the states of ‘desubjectivation’ rather than any ascent 
to subjectivity. Yet, as Giorgio Agamben has argued at length in various contexts, 
subjectivation and desubjectivation are not mutually exclusive but rather mutually 
constitutive, so that the subject is nothing but the witness to its own desubjectivation, its 
loss of intra-worldly identity. In Agamben’s linguistic theory of subjectivation the subject is 
always necessarily split between the poles of subjectivation (the passage of the living being 
into language) and desubjectivation (the expropriation of the living being in the purely 
linguistic existence of the subject as a mere pronoun ‘I’ that indicates the instance of 
discourse) (Agamben, 1999: 87-135; 1995: 95-97). In order to be constituted as a subject of 
language, the individual must undergo the expropriation of its concrete living being and 
enter the abstract linguistic system, identifying itself with the absolutely insubstantial shifter 
‘I’. On the other hand, once constituted as the subject of enunciation, the subject does not 
encounter the wealth of meaning to be transmitted, but rather the web of signifiers beyond 
its control. ‘The subject has no other content than its own desubjectivation; it becomes 
witness to its own disorder, its own oblivion as a subject.’ (Agamben, 1999: 106) 
How is this experience of dis-identification possible within a transcendentally regulated 
world? The transcendental of every world prescribes a myriad of particular identities that 
the subject may assume and move between, ranging from one’s official self-description to 
the obscene ‘secret self’. What this distribution of intra-worldly identities must necessarily 
exclude is the ontological condition of possibility of the world itself. For thinkers as different 
as Heidegger and Badiou, this condition is nothing other than the void, the Nothing in which 
beings and worlds come to appear (Heidegger, 1977: 104-108; Badiou, 2005a: 57-58, 2009a: 
112-114. See also Prozorov 2013a, chapters 1, 3). The void itself cannot appear within the 
positivity of the world without undermining its consistency. Indeed, every instance of its 
appearance is a moment of rupture, in which the relational order of one’s world appears 
suspended and all things appear in their sheer being, i.e. as an inconsistent multiplicity 
(Heidegger, 1995: 136-143). It is precisely this experience of the opening of one’s world to 
its conditions of possibility that illuminates the contingency of its positive order and makes 
possible one’s subtraction from it.  
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Thus, the possibility of dis-identification is established by the very structure of the world as 
the order of appearance that has no foundation in being. Since there is no necessary 
correspondence between being and appearance, the order of appearance, including the 
identities of the world’s objects, remains radically contingent. It is therefore possible for any 
being of the world to dissociate itself from its manner of appearance in the world, to dis -
appear in worldly terms. Thus, the subject who disrupts and overturns the order of the 
world finds its condition of possibility in the same principle that constitutes this world itself. 
Since the void as a ‘universal part’ of every world (Badiou, 2005a: 86-88) may always erupt 
in the world and reveal the inconsistent multiplicity of being beneath the veneer of 
positively ordered appearance, the subtraction from one’s identity remains a permanent 
possibility in every world. Thus, there can only be a subject because the object is  itself ‘not 
all’, i.e. the objectivity of the world is inconsistent, harbouring the void within itself.  
 
(Wo)Man of the World, Reactive and Obscure 
The subtractive experience of being ‘held out in the Nothing’ (Heidegger, 1977: 108) is 
evidently an exceptional or anomalous mode of dwelling within a world, whose 
transcendental order serves precisely to insulate the positivity of the world from any 
irruption of the void and thereby stabilize the existence of worldly beings in their assigned 
identities. Thus, while subtractive subjectivation is an ever-present possibility in every world 
due to the latter’s ontological inconsistency, it is not ever-present in actuality but is rather 
exceptional and rare. In the absence of the disclosure of the void worldly beings remain 
defined by their intra-worldly identity or their ‘place’ in the world (Badiou, 2009b: 4-12). In 
terms of Badiou’s dichotomy between the positive stability of ‘place’ and the disruption of 
‘force’ in Theory of the Subject (2009b: 13-50), these (wo)men of the world are wholly 
placed beings, whose interest consists in having every disorderly force neutralized so that 
everything and everyone would remain in their place. These worldly beings are most 
certainly endowed with agency in the world, yet this agency remains wholly objectified by 
the order of the world and does not attain subjectivity in the sense espoused in this  chapter.  
The phenomenon of voluntary servitude, famously analyzed by Etienne de la Boetie in the 
16th century (2008 [1576]) and widely addressed in modern political philosophy, particularly 
 10  
 
in the light of the Nazi and Stalinist experiences of the 20th century, becomes easier to 
understand in the context of the phenomenology of worlds. Rather than exemplify 
renunciation, perversion or escape from one’s originary freedom, voluntary servitude 
actually characterizes one’s everyday experience of being in the world, an inauthentic mode 
of everydayness that Heidegger termed ‘falling’ (Verfallen) (Heidegger, 1962: 219-224, 274-
281). Since one always finds oneself ‘thrown’ into the world, one’s positive identity 
constituted and sustained by its order, one’s everyday comportment is evidently oriented 
towards maintaining, reproducing and securing this identity, which we perceive as our 
innermost ‘self’. The participation in the reproduction of the order of the world through the 
identification with one’s  place in it is not the exception but the rule. As Heidegger remarks, 
falling being-in-the-World is simultaneously tempting and tranquilizing, offering both 
enjoyment and security, the enjoyment of security and the security of enjoyment (ibid.: 221-
222). In fact, for this servitude even to appear as servitude and not as the free expression of 
one’s worldly identity, something must happen that would weaken the hold of this identity 
on one’s being and transform a (self-)governed object into an ‘artist of not being governed’.   
In contrast to the normality of voluntary servitude, politics is an exceptional force that 
disrupts the order of distributed and differentiated places in its  drive for the maximal 
existence of the inexistent, which affirms freedom (from places), equality (of places) and 
community (without regard to place). To a (wo)man of the world, wholly reducible to its 
series of identities, this affirmation can only appear as meaningless turmoil that achieves 
nothing but the dis-placement of everything, making a mess of the world. Whatever 
problems there might be with the world (and all sensible people would agree that the world 
is not perfect), they are best dealt with by the established authorities through constructive 
adjustments and piecemeal improvements. There is thus always already a foundation for 
constructive cooperation that would ensure orderly progress towards greater freedom, 
equality and community in our world. The partisans of politics must merely abandon their 
idealistic illusions about absolute emancipation, full equality or non-exclusive community to 
realize that the existing authorities are already doing the best they can in this direction and, 
while it would not hurt to give them a little push forward once or twice, an antagonistic 
relationship with the powers of the world would only jeopardize the gains already made in 
making the world ‘a better place’ and making one’s own place in it a little better as well. 
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This line of reasoning exemplifies what Badiou calls reactive mode of subjectivity (2009a: 54-
58), which seeks to negate the political irruption and subsume its effects under the ‘way of 
the world’. The subsumption consists in the claim that whatever novelty the political 
practice has introduced (e.g. emancipatory legislation, egalitarian practices, new forms of 
community), it might have been attained in its absence, by the ‘evolutionary’ operation of 
the intra-worldly ordering mechanisms. Insofar as the irruption of politics is at all admitted, 
it is reduced to a momentary ‘time of troubles’, incapable of yielding any positive 
consequences for the world.  
If political affirmation persists in its destabilization of the transcendental, the reactive mode 
may be transformed into a less tolerant stance, characteristic of the obscure subject (ibid.: 
59-61). After all, when political praxis takes disruptive forms, from strikes and occupations 
that jeopardize the pursuit of one’s affairs in the economic network of the world to the 
leaks of government secrets that jeopardize one’s sense of intra-worldly security, things 
have certainly gone too far. What began as the movement in the name of perfectly 
agreeable ideals of freedom, equality and community went terribly wrong, ending up 
hijacked by extremists of all guises, from know-nothing youths looking for an excuse to riot 
to professional terrorists, bent on destroying our ‘way of life’. It is therefore imperative to 
restore the world to its senses by giving emergency powers to security s ervices that alone 
are capable of dealing with the threat to the very existence of the world as it is and thus to 
our very existence as worldly beings. While the reactive subject seeks to preserve the 
existing order against the disruptive effects of political affirmation by subsuming them 
under the transcendental order, the obscure subject ventures to destroy the effects of 
political affirmation as such, occulting the ‘new present’ that political practices produce. 
This occultation proceeds by the construction of the phantasmatic figure of a pure, 
transcendent social body, devoid of political divisions of the kind introduced by political 
subjects. It is in the name of this phantasmatic body that the material or bodily effects of 
politics, new emancipatory, egalitarian or communitarian forms of life, must be destroyed.  
As long as a being of the world identifies completely with its place in it, any political 
disruption of the particularistic and hierarchical order of places will be perceived as a threat 
to be countered reactively or obscurely, rather than an event to be faithful to. It is 
important to note that this negative response of the (wo)men of the world to political 
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affirmation has nothing to do with their ontological (or, for that matter, anthropological) 
characteristics and everything to do with their degree of existence in the world. Reactive or 
obscure negation of politics does not arise from the being of beings but from their 
transcendentally prescribed intra-worldly identity, with which these beings identify to the 
maximal degree. It is this coincidence of the worldly being with one’s place in the world that 
leads to the perception of every political practice as threatening the order that ensures the 
stability of these places. As long as the existence of a worldly being is reduced to persistence 
in its place, the preservation of the worldly order, including the preservation of its inexistent 
elements, is literally an existential necessity. This is why political subjectivation is relatively 
rare. Yet, as we have seen, the reduction of one’s being to one’s place in the world has no 
ontological foundation, which makes this subjectivation a permanent possibility. The subject 
is an exception whose possibility is established by the rule itself.  
 
As Not   
This understanding of subjectivity as conditioned by the traversal of inexistence resonates 
with recent attempts in political philosophy to critically re-engage with the heritage of 
Judeo-Christian messianic thought, particularly Pauline messianism (Derrida, 1994, 2005; 
Zizek, 2001; Nancy, 2008; Badiou, 2001b; Taubes, 2004; Critchley, 2012). In the First Letter 
to the Corinthians Paul explicitly identifies the messianic subject of ‘being in Christ’ with the 
inexistent, the ‘refuse of the world, the offscouring of all things’ (1 Cor. 4, 13, cited in 
Badiou, 2001b: 56). The position of the messianic subject in its world is thus from the outset 
characterized by lack, weakness and ultimately non-being. Yet, it is precisely this status that 
confers upon the subject the power of radical transformation of the world:  ‘God chose 
what is weak in the world to shame the strong; God chose what is low and despised in the 
world, even things that are not, to bring to nothing things that are.’ (1. Cor. 27-28, cited in 
Badiou, 2001b: 47. See also Critchley (2012: 157-165).) The messianic subject traverses 
inexistence in its world, becoming ‘the thing that is not’, in order to absolutize the existence 
of the inexistent and thereby transform the transcendental order of the world, ‘bringing to 
nothing things that are’.  
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More specifically, our definition of the political subject as the worldly being that subtracts 
itself from worldly determinations accords with Agamben’s interpretation of St Paul in his 
Time that Remains (2005). For Agamben, the paradigm of the ethos of the messianic subject 
is provided by the Pauline expression ‘as not’ (hos me), used in the First Letter to the 
Corinthians to describe existence in the messianic time:  
But this I say, brethren, time contracted itself, the rest is, that even those having 
wives may be as not having, and those weeping as not weeping, and those rejoicing 
as not rejoicing, and those buying as not possessing, and those using the world as 
not using it up. For passing away is the figure of this world. But I wish you to be 
without care. (I Cor. 7: 29-32, cited in Agamben, 2005: 23) 
The formula ‘as not’ must be distinguished both from the affirmation of the identity of the 
opposites (e.g. weeping is the same as not weeping) and the identification of one term with 
another (e.g. weeping is in fact rejoicing). Instead, its significance is contained in the tension 
within the concept itself, which is undermined from within by the revocation of its content 
without altering its form. The ‘as not’ should thus be kept rigorously distinct from the rather 
more familiar form of ‘as if’, which, from Kant onwards, was widely used in philosophy to 
posit fictitious conditions as ‘regulative ideas’, guiding action in the present (Agamben, 
2005: 36-37. See also Taubes, 2004: 53-54, 74-76). In contemporary political philosophy, this 
logic is operative in the Derridean version of messianism, whose famous slogan of 
‘democracy to come’ presupposes, precisely by virtue of its clear distinction from any 
‘future democracy’ (see Derrida, 2005: 90-93), that it is never actually going to arrive but 
must rather motivate contemporary praxis as if it were already here.  
On the contrary, the Pauline ‘as not’ does not leave the subject any vantage point, from 
which one could profess the ‘as if’ fiction of the already redeemed humanity: ‘The messianic 
vocation dislocates and, above all, nullifies the entire subject.’ (Agamben, 2005: 41) Thus, 
Agamben’s messianic subject is an intra-worldly being that subtracts itself from its identity 
and place in the world, continuing to inhabit it in the ‘as not’ mode. This subtraction 
requires neither the exodus from the world into fantasy and fiction nor the violent 
destruction of the world, but rather calls for existence in the world in the condition of the 
perpetual tension between its conservation as a dwelling place and its nullification as the 
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prescriptive order of places. It is not a matter of transcending the world but rather of 
rendering its transcendental inoperative. Thus, it is possible to understand Agamben’s 
minimalist approach to messianism as the ‘tiny displacement’ that leaves things ‘almost 
intact’ (Agamben, 1993: 53), but nonetheless makes all the difference. What this 
displacement consists in is precisely the weakening of the degree of one’s intra -worldly 
existence, the dis-identification with one’s place in the world, which enables the subject to 
‘reside in the world without becoming a term in it’ (Coetzee, 1985: 228). 
In Agamben’s theory of politics this movement down the existential ladder of the world is 
the sole telos of politics, which has dispensed with every positive project of transformation 
in favour of the affirmation of inoperativity as the originary ethos of humanity (Agamben, 
2000: 140-142; 2011: 245-253). This renunciation of all future-oriented transformative 
action is understandable in the context of messianic politics, which, despite its assurances to 
the contrary (Agamben 2005: 62-73; Derrida, 1994: 61-95), can never entirely break with 
the eschatological problematic. If we already dwell in the time that remains, if the end of 
days is indeed near, then it is simply not worth our while to take the risk of a frontal 
confrontation with the existing order, given its imminent decline, withering away or 
collapse. This is the interpretation that Jacob Taubes offered of Paul’s invocation of the logic 
of the ‘as not’ in 1 Corinthians 7: 
[This] means: under this time pressure, if tomorrow the whole palaver, the 
entire swindle were going to be over – in that case, there is no point in any 
revolution. That’s absolutely right, I would give the same advice. Demonstrate 
obedience to state authority, pay taxes, don’t do anything bad, don’t get 
involved in conflicts – for heaven’s sake, do not stand out! (Taubes, 2004: 54)3 
Of course, the affirmation of inoperativity might also proceed from the wager that one’s 
mere disengagement from the world might be crucial in accelerating this demise by virtue 
                                                                 
3 While Agamben’s reinterpretation of Pauline messianism does not invoke eschatological themes ( 2005: 31-
43) and explicitly differentiates messianic time from eschatological time ( ibid.: 62-78), the wider context of 
Agamben’s work certainly reveals eschatological motifs of its own, be it the permanent theme of the self-
destructive tendency of the late-capitalist society of the spectacle, the bankruptcy of peoples and nations, the 
expiry of all  historical tasks, etc. Various forms of eschatology i nevitably make a comeback in the messianic 
discourse, since the ethos of dwelling in the ‘as not’ makes l ittle sense insofar as the ‘not’ in question (the end 
of the existing state of affairs) is not held to be imminent. See Prozorov 2010 for the more detailed discussion 
of these themes. 
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of destabilizing the transcendental order of places. In the Ethics of Postcommunism 
(Prozorov 2009) I have traced this logic of inoperative politics in the social practices of the 
late-Soviet period, in which frontal dissent was supplanted by an ethos of cultivated 
disengagement from the positivity of the Soviet world that contributed to the sweeping, if 
relatively peaceful, unravelling of the system in the 1980s, precisely at the moment it sought 
to found itself anew on the basis of greater societal involvement in the Perestroika period. 
Thus, there may be good strategic reasons to restrict political practice to the subtraction 
from the transcendental, since rendering various aspects of the transcendental inoperative 
might be sufficient to deactivate or even destroy the entire order. Nonetheless, as the post-
Soviet society found out to its eventual disappointment, the transcendental of the world 
may well maintain itself in the partly deactivated or inoperative condition, just as it may 
easily tolerate the diminished, ‘as not’ existence of some of its objects. The sheer 
deactivation of the ordering force of the transcendental does nothing to raise the inexistent 
objects of this world to existence. This is why the political subject must go beyond the 
minimally messianic disengagement from the world in the ‘as not’ mode towards the actual 
redemption of the world, i.e. the overturning of those aspects of its transcendental that 
authorize the inexistence of some beings in it. 
  
Against Spontaneism and Dogmatism  
Let us now address the implications of the subtractive logic of subjectivation for the 
composition of the political subject. Is political subjectivity restricted to certain beings of the 
world or can every worldly being in principle become a faithful subject of politics? In Being 
and Event, Badiou discusses two diametrically opposite answers to this question, 
spontaneism and dogmatism. The spontaneist approach asserts that ‘the only ones who can 
take part in an event are those who made it such’ (Badiou, 2005a: 237). In this approach, 
the only possible subject of a political sequence is the one defined by the predicate that this 
politics affirms, e.g. working classes in labor politics, women in feminist politics, ethnic 
minorities in the politics of minority rights. In the phenomenological terms of Logics of 
Worlds, spontaneism is qualified as the claim that the political subject must originally belong 
to the inexistent element that comes to exist maximally as a result of political practice 
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(2009a: 391-396, 468-475). This approach would therefore reduce the set of political 
subjects to the ‘subaltern’, repressed or marginalized beings that must overcome their 
inexistence themselves. The spontaneist approach does not recognize the possibility of 
subtractive subjectivation in the sense of the weakening of one’s intra-worldly identity, 
hence it is only those who already inexist in the world that can act politically to transform it, 
while the well-placed ‘(wo)men of the world’ will always end up on the side of the existing 
order.  
This approach, familiar to us from various strands of identity politics, endows the inexistent 
object with a normative privilege arising out of its particular features. This paves the way for 
the understanding of politics as a transgressive inversion of hierarchies, whereby those 
‘missing’ in the world, lacking a place in it or relegated to the invisible site of suppressed 
existence, are suddenly given the exclusive ‘pride of place’ in the world to come because of 
the very same predicates that formerly authorized their inexistence. In contrast to this 
valorization of the inexistent, in our approach the only ‘value’ of the inexistent consists in 
the sheer fact of its inexistence, which from a universalist standpoint is sufficient to make it 
the object of political practice.4 Politics brings the inexistent to existence not because of any 
particular features of this element that presumably render it deserving of existence in the 
world. Indeed, it would be absurd to valorize the inexistent element, since as a minimal and 
non-decomposable degree of appearance it may lump together absolutely different beings 
who only share the fact of having been consigned to inexistence. It does not matter what 
inexists and why, nor is there any reason to think that whatever happens to inexist in the 
world is in any sense ‘better’ than what exists strongly or maximally. Inexistence is not 
targeted because of the empirical attributes of those resigned to this status but because it is 
in itself devoid of any ontological foundation: in their being, all beings in all worlds are by 
definition in common as free and equal and no variation in the degrees of existence could 
ever be ontologically authorized. Thus, the political process of overcoming inexistence is 
                                                                 
4 This approach to the inexistent also characterizes the work of Jacques Ranciere (1999), whose notion of the 
‘part of those who have no part’ emphasizes the structural character of the ‘non-part’ condition, which 
permits the assumption by this particular group of the universal claim to embody the ‘people’ as such. There is 
nothing in the particularity of the excluded group that authorizes this ascent to universality, other than the 
fact of the exclusion from the positive world as such. A comparison of Ranciere with Ernesto Laclau (2005) is 
instructive here. While for Laclau universality can only be an ultimately fake effect of the operation of 
hegemony that weaves together chains of equivalence around a master signifier, for Ranciere universality is 
precisely what escapes these chains by virtue of its exclusion or self-exclusion from the hegemonic domain. 
Ranciere’s true universality is whatever does not fall  under Laclau’s fake universality. 
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entirely heterogeneous to the affirmation of particular identities, even marginalized and 
suppressed ones, but rather seeks to overturn this marginalization or suppression as a 
contingent mode of the government of the world. 
The notion of inexistence also permits us to reconsider the privilege granted in 
contemporary ethico-political thought to the figure of the Other (Levinas 1999, Derrida 
1995, 1996. For a critique see Badiou, 2001a: 18-29). The inexistent is by definition the 
Other of any non-minimally existing worldly being, simply because, in contrast to the latter, 
it does not appear in the world at all. Yet, this alterity is not the property of the other itself, 
according to which it could be valorized or devalued, but rather the function of the 
transcendental order, which relegates various beings of the world to various degrees of 
existence, including the minimal one. It is this function that politics seeks to overturn, 
without any regard for the particular identities currently lumped under the rubric of 
inexistence. Politics targets the otherness of inexistence and remains utterly indifferent to 
the alterity of particular worldly beings, which is an elementary fact of ontology. 
[Infinite] alterity is quite simply what is. Any experience at all is the infinite 
deployment of infinite differences. But what we must recognize is that these 
differences hold no interest for thought, that they amount to nothing more 
than the infinite and self-evident multiplicity of humankind, as obvious in the 
difference between me and my cousin from Lyon as it is between the Shiite 
‘community’ of Iraq and the fat cowboys of Texas (Badiou, 2001a: 25-26).  
This attitude of indifference to difference appears to run contrary to the critical orientations 
that translate the ontological insights of ‘philosophies of difference’ of e.g. Foucault or 
Deleuze into positive precepts of identity politics. Yet, the indifference in question is 
arguably already at work in these philosophies themselves, whose affirmation of the 
primacy of difference on the ontological level should not be confused with the valorization 
of the different, minoritarian or subaltern in their ontic positivity.  For instance, Foucault’s 
famous call for the ‘insurrection of subjugated knowledges’ (Foucault, 1980: 81) ought to be 
understood in characteristically Foucauldian austere and minimalist terms, whereby the 
‘subjugated knowledges’ in question are entirely exhausted by the knowledge of their 
subjugation and have no positive content that would replace the knowledge authorized by 
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the oppressors. Similarly, the Deleuzian affirmation of minor politics is furthest away from 
the valorization of the particular features of the minorities in question, which for him was a 
path to a ‘micro-fascism’: ‘Marginals have always inspired fear in us and a slight horror. They 
are not clandestine enough.’  (Deleuze and Parnet, 1989: 139. See also Thoburn 2003, 
chapter 2)  
The latter point is crucial from our perspective. The ‘marginals’ that scare Deleuze are 
precisely those members of the inexistent group who make their positive identity (i.e. their 
appearance, currently foreclosed in the world) the foundation of the claim to maximal 
existence in the world: we appear to be nothing, but because of what we are, we desire to 
become everything. It is to this ‘what we are’ that a universalist politics is utterly indifferent: 
in ontological terms, the inexistent is a being like any other (free, equal and in common with 
other elements of the inconsistent multiplicity) and in ontic terms it does not appear in the 
world at all, hence there is literally nothing in particular to say about it. Politics is not an 
expression of one’s downtroddenness or marginalization, as if they were something to be 
perversely proud of, but an attempt to overcome them, hence no personal experience of 
these conditions is necessary, precisely because there is nothing positive in such 
experiences. Thus, the privilege that spontaneism grants to the inexistent must be 
withdrawn without any hesitation.  
Yet, having discarded spontaneism, we should also be wary of embracing the opposite 
approach that Badiou terms dogmatism, according to which every being of the world is 
always already a political subject in some latent sense. This approach expects the political 
affirmation to seize the entire world at once, suspending its trans cendental order of places 
and making possible its wholesale reconstruction on the basis of the ontological principles 
of community, equality and freedom. Dogmatism ignores the particularizing ordering power 
of the transcendental, wishing it away as a lifeless and inert pseudo-power of the kind 
Foucault derided in his critique of the ‘repressive hypothesis’ (Foucault, 1990: 15-49). Yet, a 
positive world, be it a family, a corporation or a nation-state, may well attain the maximum 
of tranquility and depoliticization without actual recourse to violence but through a 
combination of blackmail and seduction, cooptation and conformism, security and 
enjoyment. The transcendental order of the world is then maintained by making its 
reproduction a matter of interest for the beings positively constituted in it. The machine of 
 19  
 
intra-worldly governance may then run ‘by itself’ while the world’s inhabitants remain 
content to remain in their prescribed places and in identity with themselves. Any political 
affirmation would invariably be received by such ‘enworlded’ beings as a threat to their 
secure worldly existence and invite reactive or obscure responses. The existence of ‘placed’ 
beings that we have termed ‘(wo)men of the world’ is not a superficial distortion, beneath 
which we find the political subject in a latent form, but rather a fundamental experience of 
dwelling in the world, out of which the subject may or may not emerge in an act of 
subtraction. 
Thus, while we reject the spontaneist thesis, we must also reject the dogmatist one. While 
there is no privileged identity for a political subject and everyone in principle can become 
one, not every being in the world undergoes this becoming, precisely because it does not 
follow automatically from one’s anterior positive identity but rather involves the weakening 
of its hold on one’s existence. Politics is not a practice that one can engage in while keeping 
one’s worldly identity wholly intact. That is why anyone at all, e.g. workers, aristocrats, 
Greeks, painters, hypochondriacs, foreigners, cyclists, film stars, can participate in the 
political process, but only insofar as they are not only or, better, not wholly workers, 
aristocrats, Greeks, etc. – that there is something more in them that makes them always less 
than their worldly identity.  
At first glance, this condition by definition applies to those whose degree of existence of the 
world is already minimal and whose being evidently exceeds their appearance. However, it 
would be incorrect to automatically endow the inexistent elements of the world with the 
status of faithful subjects of politics. It is equally possible that the beings subsumed under 
the minimal degree of existence assume the reactive mode of subjectivity, negating all 
political affirmation in the illusory hope that they can evade their inexistence by obeying 
and conforming to the order of the world. This quietism of the downtrodden, who hope to 
cease to be inexistent by diligently behaving as the inexistent, is at the very least as 
prevalent historically as their engagement in political practice. Another possibility, historical 
examples of which are also numerous, is the assumption by the inexistent beings of the 
obscure mode of subjectivity, i.e. their active destruction of the effects of political 
affirmation in the service of sovereign power: from the reign of Napoleon III to the 
paroxysms of Italian fascism and German Nazism we observe the participation of the 
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inexistent of the world in the destruction of the very politics that affirms the maximization 
of their existence in the world (cf. Thoburn, 2003: 50-58). Thus, those already inexistent in 
the world are certainly capable of assuming political subjectivity, but whether they do so or 
not is entirely contingent and depends on the actual unfolding of the political sequence, in 
which faithful, reactive and obscure modes of subjectivity remain available options .  
 
The Subject’s Stimmung  
We have seen that inexistence is not a fixed category of the world that is grounded in some 
positive identitarian predicates, hence the possibility of becoming a subject is not restricted 
to those already inexistent in the world but also pertains to those beings, whose degree of 
existence is weakened from a maximal or intermediate position towards the minimum. This 
weakening may take place as a matter of the positive transformation of the transcendental 
order, whereby a formerly existent identity becomes subjugated, excluded or repressed and 
thus joins the ranks of the inexistent. Such events as the Nazi revolution in Germany, the 
Pinochet coup in Chile or the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan provide an abundance of 
examples of formerly apolitical ‘worldly beings’ becoming subjectivized as political mil itants 
as a result of their relegation to inexistence by new regimes. But, more importantly for our 
purposes, it may also take place as a result of the immanent change of the worldly being in 
question, who ceases to be wholly defined by its place in the world and thereby becomes 
capable of transforming it.  
As we have argued above, this change takes place as a result of the disclosure of the void as 
the ontological condition of the world, which manifests the contingency of its positive order 
and momentarily suspends its force. For Heidegger this disclosure is never immediately 
available but is only possible in what he called a fundamental attunement or mood 
(Stimmung). While Heidegger privileged such specific experiences as boredom and anxiety 
as exemplars of this world-disclosing mood (1962: 228-234; 1995: 82-143), we suggest that 
numerous other experiences are also capable of fracturing the unity of one’s intra-worldly 
existence and disturbing the full coincidence of the worldly being with its place in the world. 
It is possible to be ‘held out into the Nothing’ as a result of living through a natural disaster 
or a civil war, of surviving an illness or losing a loved one, but also as a result of more 
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mundane experiences of melancholy, insomnia, an amorous encounter, etc. Evidently, the 
list of such experiences also includes coming into contact, if only by accident, with an 
ongoing political sequence, which, while by definition threatening the existential security of 
the (wo)man of the world, might also appear beguiling or even seductive in the manner of 
the proverbial forbidden fruit.  
Of course, none of these experiences in themselves guarantee fidelity to the ontological 
universality manifest in them, yet neither does anxiety, which could just as well be drowned 
in drink, or boredom, which could be escaped by mindless shopping. World-disclosing 
moods are not defined by their substance but rather by the degree of the subtraction from 
the world involved in them. What is important to emphasize is  the dependence of the 
constitution of the subject, conventionally understood in terms of willful and purposeful 
activity, on something as passive as a mood, in which we habitually find ourselves without 
purpose and often against our will. The subtraction from one’s intra-worldly identity is an 
experience that the being of the world undergoes or suffers rather than decides on and 
pursues. The active intervention in the world that defines all politics is thus conditioned by 
an essentially passive experience, whereby one’s worldly existence is affected and 
minimized. The subject is any being that moves from the experience of this minimization 
towards the maximization of the existence of what the order of the world declares to 
inexist. 
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